An Anatomy of Fundamental Indexing

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Preliminary—comments very welcome

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Abstract

Proponents of Fundamental Indexing (FI) suggest that it is more profitable to base portfolio weights on indirectly size-related indicators like accounting data rather than directly on market caps. In noisy markets à la Roll (1984), it is argued, underpriced stocks (the ones that typically overperform) get underweighted and vice versa. This negative interaction implies a ‘drag’, which FI aims to avoid.

FI actually seems to pay off, but the key question is to what extent the extra return really reflects drag avoided rather than style shifts. By way of background check we first look how the proposed modifications in the portfolio weights behave, across size classes and over time. We note that (i) FI-based weights are biased towards smaller firms; (ii) this size bias is too large to be just a Bayesian reaction to noisy valuations; and (iii) the bias is very unstable over time and across size classes. The latter observation means that conventional regression analysis is plagued by unstable exposures. We find direct evidence of this in our own FF-type regressions. In addition, the choice of factors and time periods drastically changes the alphas. Regressions, in short, do not provide a reliable answer as to whether FI avoids drag to any meaningful extent.

To estimate the pure benefits from drag avoidance, purged of style shifts without having to rely on style regressions, we study an investment strategy that should be immune to drag, but without much style shift: we sort stocks into twenty size buckets (vigintiles), and form a portfolio where a stock’s weight equals the average value-weight of all stocks in its vigintile. We find no meaningful extra return relative to pure value weighting, whether at the total-portfolio level or per vigintile. Thus, avoiding drag is not why FI does well: drag is empirically unimportant. Most or all of the prima facie benefits must be from time-varying style shifts, with ‘value’ bias being identified as the most powerful.

Contents

1 The issues, and prior findings
   1.1 FI’s math in a nutshell ........................................... 3
   1.2 Value-based, fundamental, lagged and equal weights: a first exploration ........... 4
   1.3 Prior Work ...................................................... 6

2 The cross-section of weight adjustments
   2.1 What can we learn from cross-sectional analysis of weight adjustments? ........... 8
   2.2 Empirical results ................................................... 10

3 The unreliability of conventional performance analysis ........................................ 15

4 Direct estimates of the likely gains from drag avoidance
   4.1 Test procedure: mixed portfolio strategies .............................................. 20
   4.2 Results ............................................................ 21

5 Conclusion .......................................................... 27

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Key words: fund management, drag, noisy prices.
Introduction and summary

The familiar recommendation of portfolio theory in efficient markets is to mimic the market portfolio, i.e. to choose weights proportional to the firms’ relative market capitalizations. Proponents of the Fundamental Indexing investment strategy (henceforth FI) beg to disagree: while more money should be allocated to big stocks, weights should be based not on market capitalisations but on instrumental-variable-like alternatives to true value, such as relative book value, payout, cash flow, or sales. In noisy markets, the argument goes, a cap-based weight will over-weight overpriced stocks (the very stocks that tend to underperform) and will under-weight the underpriced stocks (the stocks that tend to overperform), and this negative interaction between weighting errors and subsequent return acts as a ‘drag’ on returns. If the market-value weight is replaced by an instrument, that interaction is avoided or at least reduced, so that expected returns improve. In most empirical studies, including ours, the proposed alternative weighting schemes are effectively found to boost returns and Sharpe ratios. But not all of the extra return is pure alpha: at least part is due to style- or risk-shifts. Standard regression-based estimates of alpha produce mixed result, though. In this paper we provide evidence that exposures are unstable, which invalidates regression as a diagnostic tool for FI. Our alternative tests suggest that avoiding drag is at best a trivial part of FI’s return; most or all of it is style, with ‘value’ being especially prominent.

This is relevant not just for investors. To academics that are mostly skeptical about low-hanging fruit in capital markets, our conclusion may be reassuring. Especially for the academic literature on noise in prices an analysis of FI is relevant. Brennan and Wang (2010), for instance, estimate noise volatility using a multifactor CAPM, and obtain estimates ranging from 1 percent to 25 percent, depending on the noise quantile, with an average of 6 percent. But if FI’s extra return would really stem from drag avoided, then the average would have to be at least 20 percent — or more: the amount of noise required to generate a given level of drag rises fast if mispricing is partly persistent rather than IID, and/or if it contains a market-wide component.

We obtain our conclusions as follows. As a prequel to our analysis of returns, we first look how different the weights suggested by FI are from cap-based weights. Predictably, we find a size bias towards smaller firms — much stronger, in fact, than what one would get if one’s purpose were just to correct cap-weights for noise in a Bayesian fashion. In addition, the size bias

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1They sort stocks into portfolios on the basis of the residual variance in a style regression. The 25 percent standard deviation is the figure for the noisiest group.
is non-linear in the log of market cap, and very unstable over time. This instability of the style shifts suggests that Fama-French-Carhart-like regressions may provide unreliable answers. In line with that, our Hendrikson-Merton multifactor regressions do reveal pronounced interactions between exposures and factor returns, thus confirming that exposures are unstable and establishing that their changes do affect average returns. But even if one ignores the validity issues, standard style regressions bring little clarity: the prima-facie significance of alpha is quite sensitive to the factor specification and seems to be largely confined to the dotcom crash episode.

If standard ways of estimating abnormal return do not provide firm answers, we need alternative approaches. One route we follow is a modest modification of the test proposed by Basset, Chen and Chen (2003). They advocate the use of lagged value weights rather than fundamental weights, arguing that distant weighting errors should be less correlated with current weighting errors and, therefore, with the subsequent return. Instead of using one set of lagged weights, as they do, we work with either one-, three- or six-months-lagged value weights. The older the weights, the less their error should resemble the current degree of mispricing. So older weights should generate a weaker interaction with the current period’s return and, therefore, a better return. We find no extra return at all, however. There may be something in lagged weights for very small stocks, but that effect can be traced to reversal, not to drag avoidance; and anyway, the micro-stocks’ weights are too minute to have a meaningful impact at the portfolio level.

Our second alternative test is a ‘mixed’ investment strategy that should avoid the drag effect with far less style shift than FI. Specifically, we sort stocks into 20 size buckets and then use equal weighting within each bucket but value weighting across buckets.\footnote{Treynor (2005) already advocates equal weighting as a way to avoid drag, but our mixing this with value weighting avoids the pronounced style shifts that pure equal-weighting entails.} But it again turns out that this ‘VW/EW’ mixed strategy offers no extra returns relative to full value weighting. That is, the direct gains from purely avoiding drag are economically and statistically insignificant, implying that virtually all of FT’s extra return must be from other sources, like unstable style shifts and fortuitous timing. A variant strategy, where we weight on the basis of value across within buckets and market cap across buckets, identified value investments as the main source of extra return.
Table 1: Notation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$V_{j,t}$</td>
<td>the observed market value of stock $j$ at time $t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$v_{j,t}$</td>
<td>the unobservable true market value of stock $j$ at time $t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon_{j,t}$</td>
<td>the percentage pricing error: $V_{j,t} = v_{j,t}(1 + \epsilon_{j,t})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_{j,t}$</td>
<td>the true return, i.e. $v_{j,t}/v_{j,t-1} - 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_{j,t}$</td>
<td>the noisy observed return, i.e. $R_{j,t} = r_{j,t}(1 + \epsilon_{j,t})/(1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$W_{j,t}$</td>
<td>the observed market weight of stock $j$ at time $t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_{j,t}$</td>
<td>the unobservable true value weight of stock $j$ at time $t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon_{m,t}$</td>
<td>the market-wide pricing error: $W_{j,t} = w_{j,t}(1 + \epsilon_{j,t})/(1 + \epsilon_{m,t})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_j$</td>
<td>the autocorrelation in $\epsilon_{j,t}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_j$</td>
<td>the cross-correlation between $\epsilon_{j,t}$ and $\epsilon_{m,t-1}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w^*_{j,t}$</td>
<td>a proposed alternative weight of stock $j$ at time $t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon^*_{j,t}$</td>
<td>the error in the alternative weight relative to the true weight: $w^<em><em>{j,t} = v</em>{j,t}(1 + \epsilon^</em>_{j,t})$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The issues, and prior findings

In this section we review FI’s story in more detail. We review three central results from FI theory (subsection 1.1), and then provide first-pass evidence of the extra returns in our own data set (subsection 1.2). We lastly link these findings to earlier work in this field (subsection 1.3).

1.1 FI’s math in a nutshell

Arnott and Markowitz (2008) provide the mathematical background. Our appendix presents their logic, adding a modestly more transparent way to identify the drag. In this section we just review the key elements. There are three main points. First, if prices are noisy and mispricing is unrelated to true value $v$ or true return $r$, like in Roll’s (1984) seminal model, the expectation of the noisy observed return $R$ is biased upward by a Jensen’s convexity effect (see also Brennan and Wang, 2010):

$$1 + R_{j,t} = (1 + r_{j,t}) \frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t}}{1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}},$$

$$\Rightarrow E(R_{j,t}) \approx E(r_{j,t}) + \text{var}(\epsilon)(1 - \rho_j).$$

Second, mispricing also drives a wedge between observed value weights $W$ and the true ones, $w$. If the errors are not diversified away at the market level, also the market-wide average mispricing enters into the picture:

$$W_{j,t-1} = w_{j,t-1} \frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}}{1 + \epsilon_{m,t-1}}.$$
Multiplying Equations (1) and (3), the firm-specific noise term in the denominator is replaced by the market-wide noise term. That is, value weighting means that the upward bias from $E(1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1})^{-1}$ disappears — this loss is FI’s ‘drag’ — only to be replaced by a similar but presumably smaller market-wide valuation error:

$$
(1 + R_{j,t})W_{j,t-1} = (1 + r_{j,t}) w_{j,t-1} \frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t}}{1 + \epsilon_{m,t-1}},
$$

$$
\Rightarrow E[(1 + R_j)(w_{j,t-1} - W_{j,t-1})] = E \left( (1 + r_{j,t})w_{j,t-1} \left[ \frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t}}{1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}} - \frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t}}{1 + \epsilon_{m,t-1}} \right] \right);
$$

$$
\frac{E[(1 + R_j)(w_{j,t-1} - W_{j,t-1})]}{w_{j,t-1}} \approx E(1 + r_{j,t}) \left[ \text{var}(\epsilon_j) (1 - \rho_j) - \text{var}(\epsilon_m) (1 - \gamma_j) \right].
$$

The above shows that if one could observe the noise-free weights $w$, one would gain and get back the original expected return, Equation (1). The third FI proposition is that, if one works with an alternative weight $w^*$ whose error $\epsilon^*$ is uncorrelated with the valuation error, in terms of expectations this is as good as the true weights.

From the above, the drag is driven by the variance of the percentage mispricing and its autocorrelation, in excess of the market-wide valuation error variance and its cross-correlation.

### 1.2 Value-based, fundamental, lagged and equal weights: a first exploration

While the FI claims about drag are logically an mathematically correct within a widely accepted model like Roll’s, drag still need not be economically or statistically significant. To complicate matters, drag avoided is not the only plausible source of extra returns: the FI weights may be uncorrelated with mispricing, but the modification in the weights may still be correlated with expected returns. As sceptics stress, FI puts more weight on small and ‘value’ stocks, so part of the extra return reflects style shifts. For fundamental analysis to be really useful there must be a residual average effect, not explained by the style shifts and market timing.

When the objective is to avoid drag, there are alternatives to FI. Treynor (2005) already notes that equal weighting (EW) should dilute away almost all mispricing problems, thus efficiently avoiding any interaction between weighting errors and abnormal returns. FI proponents reply that EW is infeasible in practice and creates a gigantic style shift, two problems that are substantially reduced when FI is adopted. But Basset, Chen and Chen (2007) suggest another alternative: use lagged weights (LW). This is simpler than FI, and probably largely preserves the style chosen by conventional value weighting (VW) because weights tend not to change drastically over a few months.

All of the proposed alternative weighting schemes (EW, FI and LW) typically increase
Table 2: Performance of Fundamental Indices compared to the value-weighted (VW) index, in percent per month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Avge (%)/mo</th>
<th>Stand. dev. (%)</th>
<th>Sharpe ratio</th>
<th>Δ vis-à-vis VW (%)/mo</th>
<th>t-stat</th>
<th>annual returns (%)/yr</th>
<th>diff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VW</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BV</td>
<td>1.045</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>11.62</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>10.82</td>
<td>2.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>0.961</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>10.56</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>1.187</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>12.82</td>
<td>4.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW1</td>
<td>0.760</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW3</td>
<td>0.753</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW6</td>
<td>0.740</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>7.70</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: The table shows average monthly returns, standard deviation, Sharpe ratios and monthly excess returns \( \Delta \) vis-à-vis VW the value-weighted (VW) Index for Fundamental Indexing strategies with weights based on book value (BV), sales (SL) and the (absolute value of) the free cash flow (CF). Also shown are results for portfolios where weights are equal (EW), or set equal to the value weight as observed 1, 3 or 6 months ago (LW1-6). The Sharpe ratios are not annualized. The last two columns show the geometric p.a. mean returns from following the strategy for 20 years, and the differences of the latter relative to the VW figure.

performance relative to VW. As a prelude to our review of the empirical literature we first show our own findings. (The data, described in Section 2.2, bear on U.S. stocks, 1990-2009.) Table 2 shows the *prima facie* benefits from FI, in percent per month, when portfolio weights are based on relative Book Value, Sales and the absolute value of Free Cash Flow, respectively.\(^3\)

We also show the returns from applying EW and lagged weights (LW1, LW3 and LW6). In the logic underlying FI, older weights should provide better returns, consistent with lower drag.

The returns do look promising for EW and FI, but far less so for LW. Monthly returns increase on average by 0.312% when weighting is based on Book Values, and by 0.244% and 0.228% when weighting is by Sales and the absolute value of Free Cash Flow, respectively. Annualized, this means 2.7-3.8% extra.\(^4\) In our experiment, this comes with a small increase in risk but, unlike the rise in return, an increased volatility is not a common finding in empirical work of this kind. And even in our calculations the Sharpe ratios are still up; that is, by de-

\(^3\)Absolute cash flow works better than the standard versions, CF itself or \(\text{Max}(\text{CF}, 0)\). A hugely negative cash flow tends to occur only in big firms.

\(^4\)The analysis is systematically done in terms of monthly returns, and the averages we show are the simple averages as used in standard statistics. However, these mean monthly returns could be poor indicators of long-term cumulative returns if there are serious autocorrelation patterns. The last two columns accordingly show annual returns, computed as internal rates of return \(\text{per annum}\) from the cumulative compound outcomes. Across the seven strategies, there is a 0.997 correlation between simple monthly averages and geometric annual averages. Thus, it looks correct to study just the mean monthly returns.
levering, one could have maintained volatility and still come out ahead in terms of return. EW pays an even more generous extra return, nigh 1.2 percent per month, with a predictably larger standard deviations (6%, against 4.5-5% for the other strategies). While its Sharpe ratio is not as good as the BV-based one, it still beats the other FI variants and VW. Lagged returns, finally, barely (and insignificantly) beat VW in terms of mean return and Sharpe ratio. Actually, against the FI prediction, the extra return falls with the lag length. Whether this reflects an autocorrelation pattern in the true returns, or changing style shifts, or just a coincidence is far from clear: the drop is not significant. Still, our results for the Basset et al. test, if valid, already suggests that drag may be statistically and economically insignificant and, by implication, that FI’s extra return probably has another source than drag avoided.

The issue, then, is how we can reliably find out which tests are right about the drag, and what explains the substantial differences between the LW and the FI results. But first we review what others have found and how they deal with risk.

1.3 Prior Work

Most studies find that FI-based portfolios do outperform value-weighted ones. Arnott, Hsu and Moore (2005), first, note that fundamental indexation portfolio outperform the S&P 500 by 2% on average per year between 1962 and 2004 while the volatility is very close to that of a cap-weighted index. Hemminki and Puttonen (2008) reweight the components of the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 and find a similar return advantage. Stotz, Dohnert and Wanzenfried (2007) confirm these conclusions for the DJ Euro Stoxx 600 stocks. Neukirch (2008) compares an internationally diversified portfolio of FI-weighted ETFs to the MSCI cap-weighted world index and finds overperformance. Similarly promising extra returns have also been documented by e.g. Jun and Malkiel (2008), Asness (2006), Walkhaeusl and Lobe (2010), Houwer and Plantinga (2009), Peltoaki (2010), and Mihm and Locarek-Junge (2010). Sometimes gains seem to be huge: Ferreira and Krige (2011) come forth with an extra return of 4.7% for South Africa, while Forbes and Basu (2011) conclude that in Australia the gain was above 5%. Biltz, Van de Grient and Van Vliet (2010) obtain a downright impressive 10% extra return if re-weighting is done as early as March. This may be optimistic, as they hasten to add: if on March 1 the accounting information is not actually available yet, these calculations would definitely create a look-ahead bias. But, Biltz et al. note, reweighting in September instead of in spring, for instance, kills all extra returns, a result that flatly contradicts the FI logic.

Biltz et al. are not the only skeptical authors. Chen, Chen and Basset (2007), as mentioned, propose lagged cap weights as an alternative to accounting-based weights. Unlike us, they find
that this trading rule also outperforms the cap-weighted index; still, the extra return is below that of an FI strategy. Other authors, however, question FI’s very logic. Kaplan (2008) notes that the FI weights may still be correlated with the market’s valuation errors, in which case FI works less well than promised. Perold (2007) shows analytically that a strategy of beefing up the weights for lower-cap stocks and *vice versa* does not produce any extra expected return—at least when, critically, the Bayesian prior about the true values is diffuse and returns are measured by log changes rather than orthodox simple returns. While one might quibble with these assumptions, his result still suggests that actual benefits might be minute. But, as mentioned, most critics take the line that FI introduces size and value biases, and that the extra return is just a reward for non-beta exposures (e.g. Fama and French, 2007; Dopfel, 2008; Subramaniam, Kulkarni, Kouzmenko and Melas, 2011; Perold, 2007; and others cited below).

The empirical findings on risk-adjusted returns are mixed. Many studies do find that, after the standard regression-based correction for size and value exposure, there still is an alpha return left (Stotz *et al.*, 2007; Houwer and Plantinga, 2009; Peltomäki, 2010; Mihm and Locarek-Junge, 2010; and Forbes and Basu, 2011). Others disagree, like Jun and Malkiel (2008), Amenc, Goltz and Le Sourd (2008), and Walkhäusl and Lobe (2010).

One possible explanation of the conflicting findings is that the factor exposures of FI-weighted portfolios are not constant and that changes in the betas may sometimes be correlated with factor returns, in which case the standard regression intercept does not provide a reliable estimate of the abnormal return. Walkhäusl and Lobe (2010), in fact, provide evidence that correlations between exposures and factor returns do exist: the regression coefficients for Henriksson-Merton squared factor returns are significant. The challenge, then, is how to eliminate this nuisance factor in the diagnosis.\(^6\)

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\(^5\)There are important design differences. Basset *et al.* focus on the 1000 largest stocks; their sample period is 1962–2003; and they use the 12-month median of the cap-weights rather than weights for fixed lags. We have more stocks (3400 per cross-section, on average), a different period (1990–2009), and three fixed lags.

\(^6\)The Henriksson-Merton (1981) squared factor return as an added return is able to detect, at best, linear relations between exposure and expected return; that is, it may document that variations in exposure are correlated with changes in expected factor returns (market timing), but it will miss changes in exposure uncorrelated with the market return and does not allow any generally valid conclusions about whether there actually is a genuine alpha.
2 The cross-section of weight adjustments

Prior to analyzing returns we first describe the weight adjustments proposed by FI, and ask the question whether they go beyond what now would expect from a style-neutral, Bayes-based reaction to noisy valuation.

2.1 What can we learn from cross-sectional analysis of weight adjustments?

In this section we consider cross-sections of the FI’s weight adjustments. The interesting feature of cross-sections is that, at any point in time, the aggregate market noise $e_{m,t-1}$ is a constant, so that only the noise in individual prices is active in such a cross-section. It also gives us a figure per period, instead of the unconditional estimates from regressions or autocorrelation-based tests à la Roll (1984).

We study the weight adjustment $\ln(w^*/W)$, that is, the log distance between the weights $w^*$ proposed by FI and the original market weights $W$; and we simply relate them cross-sectionally to size, $\ln V$. For ease of reading we temporarily drop time subscripts: all terms are observed at the same moment anyway. Log percentages are denoted by primes, like in $x' := \ln(1 + x)$, and cross-sectional (co)variances, unconditional on any information about the firm, are denoted by $\text{cov}$ and $\text{var}$. Below, we first write out the weight adjustments, and then look at the covariance with size, bearing in mind that within a given cross-section the market-wide mispricing, if any, is a constant. Then

$$\ln(w^*/W) = [\ln w + e^*'] - [\ln w + e' - e'_m],$$
$$= e^' - e' + e'_m;$$
$$\Rightarrow \text{cov}(w^*/W, \ln V) = \text{cov}(e^' - e', \ln v + e'),$$
$$= \text{cov}(e^', \ln v) - \text{var}(e').$$

The first term on the right is a measure of size style change, the second is a noise variance unconditional on $j$, i.e. mixing all $e'_j$s together.

At the conceptual level there are two ways to proceed. First, we can extract an upper bound on the noise. This is because the style-change-related covariance on the right is, if anything, negative: small firms get a boost and vice versa. It follows that

$$\text{if } \text{cov}(e^', \ln v) \leq 0 \text{ then } \text{var}(e') \leq -\text{cov}(w^*/W, \ln v).$$

Actually, all we know at this stage is that the covariance with the nominal value is negative. If prices are noisy, however, it is theoretically possible that the covariance with the true values would still be zero. But our tests below defuse this caveat because it would require gigantic levels of noise.
This differs from the Roll (1984) test not just because it is an upper bound rather than a floor, but also because it can be calculated period by period and, if one finesses the calculations, even per size class. These calculations can also be used to evaluate, if that is still necessary, the Null of no style shift: then the bound becomes an estimate, clean of market-wide noise and time-varying, and the plausibility of that estimate reflects on the plausibility of that Null.

The alternative use of our Equation (6) to is use priors about the level of noise, like Brennan-Wang’s estimates, and infer something about the first term on the right, the size and time-series behavior of systematic style shifts related to size.

In terms of estimation, we process each of the 233 cross-sections and show the results as time series plots of parameters. The parameters shown are actually transforms of the covariance. One is its square root, an estimated standard deviation of noise under the Null of no style shift. The other one is the covariance scaled by the variance of size—that is, the slope coefficient in the regression

$$\ln(w^*_j/W_j) = a + b \left( \ln V_j - \ln \bar{V} \right) + \nu_j. \quad (8)$$

This is easier to interpret than a covariance, and comes with a ready-made significance test.

The regression, after tweaking, also allows us to get some insight into how the noise variance changes across the size spectrum. As it stands, under FI assumptions the above regression just allows us to estimate the cross-sectional variance of the $\epsilon$‘s, which is a mixture of stock-by-stock variances. If one would confine the calculations to a particular size segment, one would get size-class-specific estimates. We can get a similar result by conditioning $b$ on size. If we allow the slope to vary linearly in size, for instance, the total adjustment becomes quadratic in size:

$$b(V_j) = b_0 + b_1 \left( \ln V_j - \ln \bar{V} \right), \quad (9)$$

then

$$\ln \frac{\hat{W}_j}{W_j} = a + [b_0 + b_1 \left( \ln V_j - \ln \bar{V} \right)] \left( \ln V_j - \ln \bar{V} \right), \quad (10)$$

We then back out a time- and size-specific covariance as $b_t(V_j) \var_t(\ln V) = [b_{0,t} + b_{1,t} \left( \ln V_{j,t} - \ln \bar{V}_t \right)] \var_t(\ln V)$.

**Are market values informative about noise? A digression**

The regression version of the above test is also interesting as it is related to the question, raised by Perold (2007), to what extent one can correct for noise by just considering the stock’s position in the histogram of log market values. Perold (2007) discusses this issue in a Bayesian framework and shows that, under a diffuse prior, the market value is uninformative. Yet Appendix B shows that the above regression, with $b$ set at $\sigma^2(\epsilon_j)/\var(\ln V)$, is exactly the
correct Bayesian correction in a lognormality model. That is, if FI managers do their job well—and style-neutrally—they would on average correct following a rule like our regression, typically increasing the weight if (and to the extent that) the stock’s size is below the average and vice versa, with a weight $b$ that equals minus the noise/signal variance ratio.

Of course, our claim and Perold’s are made in different contexts. Perold’s prior is a Bayesian one and refers to two stocks, while here we have in mind the distribution of all true market values. One can easily be agnostic about which of two similar-sized companies really is worth more, while accepting that the entire distribution for thousands of stocks is not uniform. But if the distribution of $\ln v$ were diffuse (uniform on $[-\infty, +\infty]$), then $\ln V$ would have an infinite variance, and $b$ would be zero indeed—Perold’s result. And also in actual fact Perold could be approximately right, namely if noise is small relative to the cross-sectional variance of true values. A related issue is whether corrections towards the mean is really the key mechanism behind FI’s weight adjustments. FI’s idea is to replace one set of errors by another set, independent of the first. If FI does pull this off, a small amount of regression towards the mean would be observed, but that is not a conscious policy and surely not the main objective. In that sense Perold’s objection to FI also raises the question whether size bias is the prime source of returns, as opposed to e.g. ‘value’ or momentum.

2.2 Empirical results

Data

We obtain end-of-month dollar returns for US common stocks adjusted for stock splits and dividend payments as well as their beginning-of-the-month market caps from Thomson Reuters Datastream (TRD) for the period January 1990 till May 2009. The data are carefully filtered for errors following the procedures adopted in e.g. Ince and Porter (2006). The corresponding beginning-of-the-month fundamentals (i.e. book values, sales and free cash flows) are also from TRD. In any given month we eliminate stocks with a market capitalization smaller than $10$ million, a monthly trading volume smaller than $100,000$ or a price smaller than $1$. Each

---

8Note also that this $b$ is exactly the attenuation bias expected if $v$, the ideal regressor, is replaced by a noisy version $V$. So outside a joint lognormality framework, the weight correction $[\sigma^2(\epsilon_j)/\text{var}(\ln V)](\ln V_{j,t} - \bar{\ln V}_t)$ would still be ‘best’ among all loglinear correction models.

9This is to eliminate tiny, illiquid and penny stocks which are reasonably more likely to contain data errors. Penny stocks are often fallen angels (Chan and Chen, 1991) which are highly speculative and illiquid. Tiny companies likewise have limited liquidity, can be subject to high price pressure or price manipulation, and often represent too little value to warrant attention.
month we also exclude stocks with negative or zero book value or sales.\(^\text{10}\) Note that both the market cap and all fundamental data need to be available if we want to work with one common sample for all strategies. Working with such a common sample has the advantage that differences in performance across the weighting schemes cannot be driven by differential data availability but, on the other hand, has the disadvantage that the sample size depends on the least available fundamental, namely the free cash flow. The average cross-section contains about 3,400 ongoing stock over a period of almost 20 years or, more precisely, 233 dates or 232 monthly returns. For the rebalancing frequency of the Fundamental Indices we go for monthly revisions, the standard in this line of research. Monthly rebalancing of the FI portfolios seems realistic for both institutional and private investors who need to weigh transaction costs against tracking error. Obviously this is only relevant for the fundamental indices, not for the cap-weighted one, where rebalancing is necessary only in case of stock repurchases or share issues. We do not correct for transaction costs and the dataset is free of survivorship bias. The asset-pricing factors and the T-bill rates, lastly, are from French’s website.

**An exploratory unconditional test**

We now return to the Perold-style Bayesian adjustments. A simple calculation gives a feel for what adjustments would be reasonable. In the U.S. histogram of ln\(V\) shown in Appendix B, for instance, ln\(V\) has a cross-sectional standard deviation of 1.87, which totally dwarfs the noise variances considered thus far. Table 3 illustrates what kind of Bayesian update factors we get assuming errors standard deviations of 1 and 6\% (Brennan and Wang’s lower and mean estimates) and 20 and 30\% (their estimates for very noisy stocks), for market values whose logs are -4 to +4 standard deviations away from the mean. The rational style-neutral price correction is typically less than 20 percent even for the highest noise level and for very small or large stocks. For the central Brennan-Wang estimated values it is absolutely tiny.

Contrast this to what actually happens. Every month we sort stocks on size, and we put each of them into one of twenty size buckets (0-5\%, 5-10\%, etc) or vigintiles. Figure 1 shows for every vigintile and FI strategy the ratio of average FI-recommended weight over average market weight. We see that for the smallest stocks the FI weights are, on average, 2.5 to

\(^{10}\)Negative and zero book values and sales are almost surely mistakes. Negative free cash flows, in contrast, make more sense and are much more prevalent. We do not weight on the basis of dividends because too many stock/year combinations then produce zero weights, leading to a portfolio that is biased against small and distressed stocks.
Table 3: **Calculated value-correction factors** \((\text{E}(v|V)/V - 1) \times 100\) for the U.S. \((\sigma_V = 1.87)\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(\sigma_v, %)</th>
<th>-4</th>
<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key** In the samples shown in the graph, selected percentile observations are corrected following equation. The table shows values for \(\text{EXP}(-\left(\frac{\sigma_V^2}{\text{var}(\ln V)}\right)(\ln V_j - \ln V)) - 1\), in percent.

Figure 1: **Average relative fundamental size divided by the average relative market value of the US size buckets**

3.75 times the market weights rather than 1.2 times or less, as Table 3 suggested. In fact, even at the 75th size percentile the FI weights are still 1.5 times their market counterparts. Obviously, bearing in mind the result from the above table, the amount of noise needed to explain such drastic corrections as pure Bayesian adjustments should be vastly larger than the values we just considered. To see how much larger, and how this varies over time, we turn to the regression tests.
Cross-sectional regressions

We start with the linear regression. Figure 2 shows time-series plots of the 233 month-by-month slope coefficients for each of the weighting schemes. The slopes are very variable over time, with a substantial autocorrelation. The slopes are, in addition, negative over most of our sample; only for cash-flow-based weights the $b$s turn mildly positive for a non-trivial length of time, namely the intercrisis lull of late 2003 to early 2007. A typical value for $b$ is $-0.10$ to $-0.15$.

Assuming, initially, there is no style shift, this should be an estimate of $-\text{var}(\epsilon')/\text{var}(\ln V)$. Figure 3 shows this implied noise as a volatility, $\sqrt{-b \text{ var}(\ln V)}$, for each of the monthly cross sections, using the month’s $b$ and cross-sectional variance of ln $V$. The estimates based on sales or cash flow show the highest variability over time and contain episodes where the procedure breaks down because of a positive $b$, so that computing a mean for the implied noise would be questionable. But for book value as the FI variable we have a stable and uninterrupted series of negative $b$s.

As an upper bound on noise, the numbers pictured in Figure 3 potentially makes sense in a qualitative sense, rising around the 2000/01 bubble-and-crash and the 2008-09 crisis, and falling to low levels in-between these two crisis episodes. But as an actual estimate of noise,
Figure 3: **Plot of critical noise standard deviation over time implied by the regression** \( \ln \hat{W}_j = a + b \ln V_j - \ln V \)

(i.e. under the Null of style neutrality) the levels of the required noise, mostly 60-80% but with peaks of up to 100%, are really egregious. This is 10-12 times the Brennan-Wang estimates, making it utterly implausible that the shrinkage entails no style shift.

From the above we conclude that taking the cross-sectional covariance \( \text{cov}(w^*/W, \ln V) \) as an estimate of the noise variance does not make sense. But then the alternative extreme view should work better: \( \text{cov}(w^*/W, \ln V) \) must be largely reflecting the style shift component, \( \text{cov}(w^*/W, \ln v) \). If we take the Brennan and Wang central estimate as our starting point, then the average noise variance is of order of magnitude \( 0.06^2 = 0.0036 \), which is about one percent of the actual average covariance, typically 0.3 to 0.4. Thus, 99% of the changes in \( b \) reflects changes in style shift, giving us direct evidence that the style shift must be very unstable.

And this is just the tip of an iceberg, as we discover when we turn to the quadratic model where, it will be recalled, we let \( b \) depend on size: \( b(V,t) = b_{0,t} + b_{1,t} \ln V_{j,t} - \ln V_j \). Figure 4 shows time series plots of \( b_0 \) and \( b_1 \) for each of the three FI weighting schemes. Almost by design, \( b_0 \) behaves quite similarly to the slope from the linear regression, confirming that there
Figure 4: Estimated $b_0$ and $b_1$ for BV weights in Equation (10)

Key Every month, logs of FI-weights over market weights are regressed cross-sectionally on demeaned log market values, with a slope that is linear in the demeaned log market value: $\ln\left(\frac{W_j}{W_j}\right) = a + [b_0 + b_1 (\ln V_j - \ln V)] (\ln V_j - \ln V)$. The graph shows the time series of estimated $b_0$ and $b_1$.

is shrinkage for the average stock. More interestingly, most of the estimated $b_1$s are positive (i.e. small stocks are often shrunk towards the mean to a greater extent than average-sized or big ones) but this is not always and everywhere the case. There is, in fact, a marked downward trend in all $b_1$s during all of the 1990s, and the one for BV actually falls to about zero in 1997; $b_1$ even dips into negative values around the time of the dot.com bubble (1999). Afterwards $b_1$ floats around zero (meaning that weight adjustments are roughly linear in log size), only to re-emerge when the 2008-crisis starts unfolding. In short, then, there must have been substantial style shifts, unstable both across the size spectrum and over time. This raises questions about style regressions: their assumedly constant exposures to all risks is hard to swallow. We do find indirect evidence of time-shifting exposures in our own Carhart-style regressions. The next section has the tale.

3 The unreliability of conventional performance analysis

For the FI, EW, and LW portfolios we compute returns in excess of the VW return, we regress them on the Fama-French factors augmented with the momentum factor, following Carhart (1997), and we do the standard Newey-West t-test for a zero value of the intercept, alpha.

The results are summarized in Panel A of Table 4. Since the left-hand variable is a return in excess of the VW return, the coefficients estimate the exposures to market, SMB, HML and Momentum as differentials relative to those of VW. These numbers do reveal some style shift, as usual. Specifically, relative to VW, FI imparts a small but significant upward boost to the portfolio’s sensitivity to the market, somewhat more to its exposure to SMB, and a lot to its
Figure 5: Total shrinkage factor (top) and noise standard deviation required to make such shrinkage a normal Bayesian update (bottom) for vigintiles 1, 5, 10, 15 and 20, using BV weights in Equation (10)

Key  Every month, logs of FI-weights over market weights are regressed cross-sectionally on demeaned log market values, with a slope that is linear in the demeaned log market value: \( \ln(\hat{W}_j/W_j) = a + [b_0 + b_1 (\ln V_j - \ln \bar{V})] (\ln V_j - \ln \bar{V}) \). The top graph shows the time series of estimated \( b(t,V) = b_0 + b_1 (\ln V_j - \ln \bar{V}) \) for the 1st, 5th, 10th, 15th and 20th vigintile firm. The bottom graph shows, for each of the three FI weights, \( \sqrt{-b(t,V) \text{var}(\ln V)} \), which is the level of noise that would make the observed degree of shrinking a rational Bayesian response to noise.
sensitivity to HML. More unexpectedly perhaps, there is negative exposure to momentum, a phenomenon we return to below. Among FI’s competitors, EW is especially exposed to SMB, as one would expect, but hardly more to market and HML than the VW portfolio. Using lagged weights affects style far less than adopting FI, again as expected, except for some exposure to SMB (LW3 and LW6). We conclude that FI goes for style shifts. But the alphas tell us that these increased exposures do not seem to explain away all of the extra return we have noted before. In fact, all FI strategies provide a positive risk-adjusted return of 0.2-0.3 percent per month, which is large in both statistical and economic terms; EW, with almost 0.4 percent per month, does even better; and also LW6 seems to add value, once its lower risk is accounted for, while LW1 and LW3’s alphas approach significance ($p = 0.069$ and 0.049, one-sided).

But the conclusion may be less straightforward than it seems at this stage. The strongly negative extra exposure to momentum, for one, is somewhat puzzling and may really mean a positive exposure to reversal. The potential for a link between momentum/reversal and the weighting scheme is logically clearest for the LW strategies. The difference between the LW and VW returns is driven by the change of weights over the preceding $L$ months, which in turn is determined by the stock’s return in excess of the market return during that period; so weighting on the basis of the change in relative market cap means betting on reversal, against momentum.\footnote{For example, if a stock has underperformed the market, then the lagged weight it gets is higher than the current one. If giving a positive differential weight to past losers seems to pay, as it does here, we can conclude there was reversal.}

For FI strategies there is a link with reversal too, albeit weaker: the FI weights are insensitive to recent changes in market value, so the differences with the VW return are driven by two elements: (i) the gap between the FI weights at time $t$ and the VW weights at time $t - L$, and (ii) the changes in the value weights between $t - L$ and $t$. This last item is the same as for LW, so the presence of the first extra source of deviations may obscure the link with recent changes in value weights but may not wipe it out totally.

We relegate our study of reversal to an Appendix, so as not to break the flow too much. The finding is that there seems to be some momentum among the bigger stocks, and strong reversal within the smallest-stock buckets. Reversal may to some extent reflect a single outlier event, like the rebound after the 2008 crash, but we will show that at least part is also due to an ongoing fallen-angel effect.\footnote{The fallen-angel effect is documented by e.g. Chan and Chen (1991), Chen and Zhang (1998), Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990), Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2002) or Peyer and Vermaelen (2009). Bearing in mind their own resumé, the story goes, professional portfolio managers are reluctant to invest in stocks that did quite badly recently, so prices are depressed and expected returns high.} But whatever the explanation, the reversal identified by the
Table 4: **Performance analysis of competing investment strategies (returns in excess of VW)**

### Panel A: FF factors plus Momentum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>α (%/month)</th>
<th>market (β)</th>
<th>SMB (γ)</th>
<th>HML (δ)</th>
<th>Momentum (ζ)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>coeff</td>
<td>tstat</td>
<td>coeff</td>
<td>tstat</td>
<td>coeff</td>
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<tr>
<td>BV</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>6.044</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>2.504</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>3.289</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>3.451</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>2.172</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>3.468</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW1</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>1.481</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>2.086</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW3</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>1.654</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>2.394</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW6</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>2.381</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>1.683</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Panel B: FF factors plus Short-term reversal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>α (%/month)</th>
<th>market (β)</th>
<th>SMB (γ)</th>
<th>HML (δ)</th>
<th>Sh-t revrsl (η)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>coeff</td>
<td>tstat</td>
<td>coeff</td>
<td>tstat</td>
<td>coeff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BV</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>2.996</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>3.821</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.967</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>1.941</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>1.314</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>3.349</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>1.981</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.903</td>
<td>0.763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW1</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.812</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW3</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>2.389</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW6</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.386</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>3.017</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Panel C: FF factors plus a dot.com dummy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>α (%/month)</th>
<th>market (β)</th>
<th>SMB (γ)</th>
<th>HML (δ)</th>
<th>dot.com (θ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>coeff</td>
<td>tstat</td>
<td>coeff</td>
<td>tstat</td>
<td>coeff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BV</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>1.270</td>
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<td>5.971</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.247</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>3.653</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.179</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>3.539</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>1.384</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>2.348</td>
<td>0.761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW1</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.519</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>3.801</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW3</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>-1.034</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>5.119</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LW6</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>-0.810</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>5.025</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key**  Panel A of the table shows Carhart-style (1997) performance analysis regressions, using percentage monthly returns. The left-hand-side variable is the return in excess of the VW return for Fundamental Indexing strategies with weights based on book value (BV), sales (SL) and the (absolute value of) the free cash flow CF). Also shown are results for portfolios where weights are equal (the 1/N rule), or set equal to the value weight as observed 1, 3 or 6 months ago. In Panels B and C, Momentum is replaced by short-term reversal and a dot.com crash dummy (March 2000 till October 2002, respectively. T-stats are Newey-West-corrected, and all factors are from K. French’s website.

The asymmetry between winners and losers also suggests different correction speeds. Winners seem to be either initially undervalued firms whose prices slowly correct, or firms that gradually get more overvalued and whose eventual price correction takes place beyond the our six-month horizon. Losers, in contrast, are much more likely to be briefly undervalued. With a faster correction, chances of capturing that correction within our horizon are better; and even if all corrections do happen inside the horizon, a sudden correction produces a...
The finding of strong reversal prompted us to replace, in the performance analysis regressions, the momentum factor by French’s short-term reversal factor, STR. Panel B of Table 4 shows the new results. We find clear evidence of positive extra exposure to STR in all strategies, and most clearly so in the LW portfolios. In fact, the t-ratios for STR are all bigger, in absolute terms, than those for momentum. In addition, all alphas except BV’s are now insignificant. So it seems that the performance analysis results are not robust with respect to the choice of the factors, even if the versions are as closely related as momentum and reversal.

There may be other problems with the standard regressions. Familiarly, exposures are assumed to be constant. Variability over time is especially problematic if it is correlated with the factor’s price of risk: then the cross-product gets mistaken for genuine alpha. In our analysis of the weight adjustments (Section 2) we do find that FI’s size mix varies substantially over time, with the end of the dot.com period being especially atypical. That period also had unusual SMB returns. When we accordingly add to the FF model a dot.com crash dummy (March 2000-October 2002)\textsuperscript{14} as a crude way to separate this unusual period, see Panel C of Table 4, all alphas again become insignificant even without STR in the regression.

Another illustration of changing exposures is provided in Table 5, which shows t-tests for the parameters in a Carhart regression augmented with interactions between the market and each of the four factors, à la Henriksson-Merton (1981). The regressee is still the extra return for each FI strategy relative to VW, and a significant t-ratio signals that changes in the differential beta are correlated with unusual returns in the factor. For all three FI strategies, $\beta$ is significantly down when small stocks do well. For BV, $\beta$ is down also when value stocks pay off more, and maybe even when momentum is high ($p = 0.086$, two-sided). The test is exploratory only, as the other exposures are still treated as constant, but for our purpose the results suffice to reject a regular Carhart test as unreliable in this data set.

This is not a comfortable situation. To FI supporters, the above tests may look like unscientifically experimenting with alternative risk-adjustment models until results do conform to orthodoxy’s priors. For this reason we now propose alternative ways to find out whether FI’s extra returns largely reflect drag avoided.

\begin{itemize}
\item higher mean monthly return than a gradual one. For instance, if a price goes from 50 to 100 in five equal steps, the average per period return is 0.15. In contrast, if it jumps from 50 to 100 in period 1 and then pays four zero returns, the average return is 0.20.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{14}The dot-com bubble burst on Friday, March 10, 2000. The technology heavy NASDAQ Composite index had just peaked at 5,048.62 (intra-day peak 5,132.52), more than double its value just a year before. USD 5 trillion in market cap disappeared from March 2000 to October 2002.
Table 5: **T-tests for Carhart regressors and their interactions with the market factor**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MKT</th>
<th>HML</th>
<th>SMB</th>
<th>MOM</th>
<th>MKT</th>
<th>HML</th>
<th>SMB</th>
<th>MOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>2.826</td>
<td>-0.658</td>
<td>1.146</td>
<td>-0.357</td>
<td>-4.176</td>
<td>-0.882</td>
<td>4.483</td>
<td>14.705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>2.988</td>
<td>1.128</td>
<td>1.089</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>-4.440</td>
<td>-1.544</td>
<td>-0.260</td>
<td>13.904</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key** For each of the FI return series we run a Carhart regression augmented by interactions with the market. The table shows the t-ratios.

4 **Direct estimates of the likely gains from drag avoidance**

If FI is just about drag avoidance, any set of weights whose errors are uncorrelated with the market’s will do. In general, the problem is how to make sure the alternative weights do not pick up an unexpected style shift (like reversal, in LW) or, in the case of expected style shifts, how to find out whether a conventional regression-based risk correction is adequate. In this paper we propose mixtures of VW with either FI, EW or LW.

4.1 **Test procedure: mixed portfolio strategies**

Our alternative test starts from Treynor’s (2005) EW proposal. To avoid the concomitant style shift, we adopt a mixture of VW and EW, where portfolio capital is allocated to stocks in two steps. At the beginning of every month, we first sort all stocks into 20 equally-populated size buckets (vigintiles). We assign capital to each size bucket as a whole on the basis of the bucket’s aggregate market cap, like in VW. Within the bucket, however, we weight equally, Treynor-style. In other words, each company’ own value weight is replaced by the average market-value weight of all stocks in the company’s size vigintile. The strategy is referred to as the VW/EW mixture.

Studying the VW/EW returns is useful for the following reasons. First, like FI and its competitors, this portfolio rule should avoid drag. In fact, using averaged weights means that the pricing error for an individual stock is replaced by the average pricing error for all stocks in the size bucket; so if a vigintile has \( N_v \) stocks, the variance of the stock’s pricing error relative to the market’s could be reduced by a factor of up to \( 1/N_v \).\(^{15}\) Second, this drag reduction is achieved with far less scope for style changes than under a regular EW strategy, especially

\(^{15}\)This analysis is too optimistic: sorting by size \( V \) means some bunching of valuation errors \( \epsilon \), as argued in section 2; so the average error is not quite as good as the \( 1/N \) rule would suggest. Recall, however, that \( 1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1} \) is scaled by \( 1 + \epsilon_{m,t-1} \); so any market-wide errors are already neutralized.
as far as size is concerned. One may object that this procedure just conditions the buckets on market cap, not on \textit{e.g.} book-to-market and momentum. But there is some reassurance from our finding, in the style regressions from Section 3, that an EW portfolio is not exposed to HML, and least exposed to momentum/reversal among all strategies. A third advantage is that the results can be studied not just at the total-portfolio level, but also bucket per bucket, giving us some clues as to from what size groups the gains, if any, are coming from.

In addition, we apply variants of the above design: in step 1 we still put stocks into buckets per size vigintile and weight the latter by market cap, but within each of these size buckets we assign, in step 2, weights based on fundamental variables or lagged relative market cap. These mixed styles are referred to as VW/FI, etc, with VW again indicating the weighting across vigintiles and FI (specified as either BV, SL, or CF) indicating the rule for weighting within them. In terms of drag, bucket per bucket, these strategies should not do better or worse than the VW/EW variant; so if they do generate higher returns, we have direct evidence of style shifts, even at the within-bucket level. Thus, we can decompose the extra return of a FI-mixed strategy relative a full VW strategy (denoted VW/VW) into two components:

$$E(r^{vw/fi} - r^{vw/vw}) = E(r^{vw/fi} - r^{vw/ew}) + E(r^{vw/ew} - r^{vw/vw}),$$

This shows, bucket by bucket, how much comes from drag and how much from within-vigintile style shift. Shifts in exposure to HML, for instance, are especially likely in BV-weighted portfolios, even when overall bucket weights are set by market value: since within each size bucket the market values are rather similar, sorting on book value is close to sorting on book/market, creating HML exposure. If that analysis is valid, the style shift should show up as an extra return above the bucket’s EW return. Table 6 summarizes what sources of return are present in each of the mixed strategies.

4.2 Results

Results (1): total and risk-adjusted returns at the portfolio level

Table 7 shows how the mean extra returns (relative to VW) and standard deviations are shifting after mixing the strategy with VW. The first line recapitulates the results for the pure strategies, like EW/EW and LW/LW etc, and the second line those for the corresponding mixed strategies. The difference show how strongly size bias affects the return. Predictably, this is pronounced for EW, and minute for the three LW strategies. Among the three FI investment
Table 6: Sources of return likely to be present in each of the mixed strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>strategy</th>
<th>factor exposures</th>
<th>summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VW/EW</td>
<td>≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0</td>
<td>low drag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VW/LW</td>
<td>≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0</td>
<td>drag; reversal for small stocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VW/BV</td>
<td>&gt; 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 &gt; 0</td>
<td>drag, some market; substantial ‘value’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VW/CF</td>
<td>&gt; 0 ≈ 0 &gt; 0 &gt; 0</td>
<td>drag, some market; ‘value’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VW/SL</td>
<td>&gt; 0 ≈ 0 &gt; 0 low</td>
<td>drag, some market; ‘value’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key Every month, all stocks are assigned to one of twenty equal-sized size classes (vigintiles). Capital is allocated to each vigintile on the basis of market weight, but within vigintiles we use either equal weighting (EW), lagged weights (LW), or weights based on book value (BV) or free cash flow (CF), or sales (SL). For each portfolio strategy, returns will be compared to VW/VW. The entries in the table show the exposures of each such strategy to the four factors, and the resulting interpretation of any extra return.

rules, only sales-based investing is strongly size-biased: three quarters of the return disappears after controlling for size. The other FI strategies are mostly HML-biased: size explains just one third of the book-value-based returns (BV), and one-quarter of the CF-based results. So for the conventional FI strategy, where the competing FI weights are averaged, size bias is less important than value bias.

Line three show a t-statistic when the returns from line two are tested against a Null of zero. Even though the mean extra returns relative to VW/VW remain economically large, most of them become insignificant. The exception is the VW/BV mixture. Since drag avoidance should be similar across the mixed strategies and size is largely controlled for, the differential performance of VW/BV relative to VW/EW must be mostly value.

We next turn to the bucket-by-bucket results, starting with EW.

Table 7: Mean extra return and standard deviations: pure v mixed style portfolios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>weighting across vigintiles</th>
<th>weighting scheme within vigintile</th>
<th>extra average monthly returns, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>based on chosen style (i.e. pure strategy)</td>
<td>EW LW1 LW3 LW3 BV SL CF</td>
<td>1.400 0.100 0.240 0.390 0.310 0.250 0.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>based on market weights (mixed strategy)</td>
<td>EW LW1 LW3 LW3 BV SL CF</td>
<td>0.170 0.090 0.210 0.350 0.220 0.060 0.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t versus VW</td>
<td>EW LW1 LW3 LW3 BV SL CF</td>
<td>0.960 1.230 0.140 -0.100 2.980 1.430 1.880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>based on chosen style (i.e. pure strategy)</th>
<th>extra stdev of monthly returns, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>based on market weights (mixed strategy)</td>
<td>0.310 0.250 0.280 1.400 0.100 0.240 0.390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>based on market weights (mixed strategy)</td>
<td>0.220 0.060 0.200 0.170 0.090 0.210 0.350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key The table shows mean returns in excess of the VW return for the original strategies and their mixed versions, and t-statistics for the latter return. In all the mixed versions, the non-VW weighting rules are applied within vigintiles only; across vigintiles, the weights are value-based. The last two lines show standard deviations in excess of those from VW. All returns are in percent per month.
Figure 6: Extra return from alternative indices, calculated per size bucket (1990-2009)

Key: Each month stocks are sorted per market cap in 20 equally-populated buckets (vigintiles). For every vigintile, monthly returns are calculated using, as intra-bucket weights, either equal weights, or weights based on book value, sales, absolute free cash flow and the one-, three- and six-month lagged market value weights. The graphs show the average excess returns per bucket relative to the VW return for the same bucket.

Results (2): performance of the VW/EW mixture, per vigintile

Figure 6 summarizes the performance of each of the mixed weighting schemes via its average monthly return in excess of the bucket’s market-value weighted index. For the VW/FI and VW/EW strategies, in addition, we consider the FF alphas for each bucket’s return in excess of standard VW, see Table 8 and Figure 7. This subsection just discusses the key strategy, VW/EW.

First, the extra returns realized by EW within each vigintile relative to its value-weighted counterpart are essentially zero, at least for size classes 3 to 20, suggesting that drag-avoidance benefits are economically and statistically meaningless. The same conclusion holds for conventionally risk-adjusted returns: for all buckets except the first two, the alphas are economically and statistically insignificant. All this is consistent with net drag being minute, except possibly for the smallest stocks. It also means the FI’s return cannot come from drag avoidance: even if the two smallest buckets would do a good job at avoiding drag (about which there are doubts—see below), they represent too little market value to meaningfully affect any implementable portfolio—just look at VW/EW’s meagre 0.0048 percent overall performance, for
Figure 7: **Alphas from Fama-French regressions per size bucket.**

![Graph showing alphas from Fama-French regressions per size bucket.](image)

**Key** Every month, stocks are sorted into size vigintiles, and within that smaller universe a FI investment style is applied. Returns from these FI portfolios in excess of the VW return are then regressed on three FF factors. The figure plots the 20 intercepts (alphas).

instance (Table 7). Optimistically, the near-zero drag in most stocks could mean markets are quite efficient; realistically, it could also mean that there is a high persistence and/or a large market-wide component in the pricing errors.

Let’s now consider the smallest stocks, FI’s last hope. Potential sources of return other than drag avoidance are readily at hand. At the very least, the return is to some extent due to the strong reversal phenomenon documented above. In fact, it turns out that vigintiles 2 and especially 1 contain many fallen angels. In Figure 8 we plot for each of the size buckets (i) the equally-weighted portfolio monthly return (the total return, this time, rather than the extra return relative to a cap-weighted investment) and (ii) the equally-weighted monthly average return over the preceding six months for all stocks that are in the vigintile at \( t \). (Months \( t - 7 \) to \( t - 2 \), to be precise.) The difference between the two curves is, of course, due to migration between deciles: if all stocks always remained in a given bucket, both averages of monthly returns would essentially coincide. Unsurprisingly, stocks below the size median tend to be stocks that did somewhat poorly in the preceding six months. This is especially true for the two smallest-stock vigintiles, whose average lagged return over six months underperforms by about 2 and 1 percent, respectively, i.e. effectively 13 and 6 percent over six months. Some of that value loss is recuperated subsequently: the 5% smallest stocks overperform by over 3
Table 8: **Alphas from Fama-French regressions per size bucket.** The dependent variables are the extra returns on the FI-weighted portfolios relative to VW, calculated per bucket

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size bucket</th>
<th>EW (t)</th>
<th>SL (t)</th>
<th>CF (t)</th>
<th>BV (t)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(small)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket1</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>1.142</td>
<td>1.309</td>
<td>0.893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket2</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket3</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket4</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket5</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.717</td>
<td>0.427</td>
<td>0.879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket6</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket7</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket8</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket9</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>0.781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket10</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket11</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket12</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket13</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>0.523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket14</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>0.338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket15</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket16</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket17</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket18</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket19</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(large)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket20</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key** Every month, stocks are sorted into size vigintiles, and within that smaller universe a FI investment style is applied. Returns from these FI mini-portfolios in excess of the VW return are then regressed on three FF factors. The intercepts (alpha) are shown, with their Newey-West t; they are in per cent per month.

Returning to Figures 6-7 and Table 8, the diagnosis is that drag is surely not the total answer: the smaller EW bucket portfolios have stumbled upon a strategy that happens to exploit the fallen-angel anomaly. Also, we repeat, the low-cap stocks are too small anyway to have a meaningful impact on any realistic portfolio; so even if there actually is some net drag at the lower end of the size spectrum it does not explain FTs extra returns.

**Results (3): performance of the other mixtures, per vigintile**

Returning to Figures 6 and 7, let us consider portfolios weighted on lagged market values. We see that, within a size bucket, LW strategies do not provide any meaningful benefits either, except in the first smaller vigintiles for lags 3 and 6. This may again be due to drag, to some extent. Actually, this time we do observe that the longer the lag, the higher the return, which is consistent with a noisy-market model where errors (and therefore also drag) take time to disappear. But it is more than plausible that fallen angels helped here, too: relative to VW,
Figure 8: **Mean return and mean return over the preceding six months**,

![Graph showing mean return and mean return over the preceding six months](image)

**Key** At the start of each month $t$ stocks are allocated to 20 size buckets. "Return" is the average EW return per bucket. "Six-month lagged return" is a monthly average—not the total (cumulated) return—over the six months $t - 2$ to $t - 7$, on the stocks that, in month $t$, will be in vigintile $v$. This is a hindsight result, not a feasible investment strategy.

LW actively loads on underperformers and $vv$. Regardless, LW’s total extra returns at the portfolio level, which are insignificant, also tell us again that the bit of drag that might have been avoided among the small stocks by no means adds anything economically material to the overall performance.

Turning, lastly, to the VW/FI portfolios, we note a substantially positive extra return relative to their VW/VW and VW/EW benchmarks for each size bucket all the way up to vigintile 17 or 18. The difference relative to VW/EW tells us that there must have been extra sources of return over and above drag avoidance, like style changes. Note, for instance, that the best extra returns are obtained by BV-weighting, which implies a bet on HML. Yet when we correct for FF risks (Table 8), via regression, the alphas for the BV strategy remain significant for all vigintiles but the largest ones. Whether this means that fundamental analysis really adds value (even in the crude way applied by FI), or that the FF model misses something, or that the exposures are too unstable over time (Section 2) is impossible to say from the above tests. But we can definitely put the rest to idea that purely avoiding drag is a strategy that pays off well.
5 Conclusion

Building portfolios based on weights from fundamental corporate data instead of weights equal to market cap should increase portfolio returns, and our first-pass results are promising, like in many prior studies. FI believers stress that extra returns can be reaped from avoidance of drag, by using weights that are less correlated with mispricing. But also style shifts or market timing can be at work, which would mean that not all of the extra returns stem from genuine selectivity.

In our time series, generalized Jensen-FF regressions do not provide reliable measures of pure extra return (alpha), as FI’s factor exposures are shown to be unstable. This instability may be one of the reasons why the results also differ so much depending on the factors and the sample period. So in most of the paper we try to establish, without resorting to style regressions, that there are style shifts, that they are unstable, and that drag itself is a negligible phenomenon.

Taking again the absence of style shift as our Null, we test whether FI is shrinking the weights towards the mean by no more than what noisy prices justify. We find massive upward corrections for small stocks, and these could reflect pure drag only if noise were at implausibly high levels. More likely, therefore, the boosting of investments in small stocks is a style shift. We also note that the correction patterns across the weight spectrum are quite variable over time: sometimes small stocks’ overweights are at least quadratically related to size, while at other times the link is more linear, or disappears, or even reverts. This fits in with the shifts in exposure documented via Hendrikson-Merton regressions.

As an alternative way to estimate drag we introduce mixed strategies, focusing primarily on ‘VW/EW’, i.e. value weighting across size vigintiles and equal weighting within vigintiles. This should still avoid drag and largely sidestep any style shifts. We find that the extra return is economically and statistically insignificant when measured at the total-portfolio level. These negative results also fit in with those from lagged weights à la Basset and Chen, where no extra return is found even though these strategies should avoid drag just as much as VW/EW and FI or VW/FI. For the smallest stocks there seems to be some extra return but these markets are too small to mean much, in practice, and most of the returns seem to come from reversal.

Mixing value weighting with FI instead of with EW pays extra returns for far more stocks, and shows that value bias is a strong component of FI’s extra return, beside size bias. Drag, however, is not. It is an intellectually plausible idea, and it seems to sell well, but that’s all there is to it.
Appendix A: FI and portfolio performance: reviewing the math

Let $V_{j,t}$ denote the price of asset $j$ observed at time $t$. In a Roll (1984) noisy-markets model, $V_{j,t}$ is a combination of noise $\epsilon_t$ overimposed on the true price $v_{j,t}$. The noise could be additive or, more plausibly, multiplicative. In the latter case, the relation is

$$V_{j,t} = v_{j,t}(1 + \epsilon_{j,t})$$

where $E(\epsilon_{j,t} | v_{j,t}) = 0$. \hspace{1cm} (12)

One familiar implication is that the return observed between $t-1$ and $t$, $R_{j,t}$, can be composed into a true return, here denoted as $r_{j,t}$, and the noise or pricing error, which we allow to exhibit autocorrelation:

$$1 + R_{j,t} := \frac{V_{j,t}}{V_{j,t-1}} = \frac{v_{j,t}}{v_{j,t-1}} \frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t}}{1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}},$$

$$=: (1 + r_{j,t}) \frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t}}{1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}},$$

with

$$\epsilon_{j,t} = \rho_j \epsilon_{j,t-1} + \nu_{j,t-1}. \hspace{1cm} (14)$$

The ratio of the two errors terms is mean-reverting; that is, we have $0 \leq \rho_j < 1$. A familiar implication of this mean-reversion is that undervalued stocks tend to overperform. Note that the net effect on the expected one-period return is positive, as a result of the convexity of the above return in $\epsilon_{j,t-1}$ and Jensen’s Inequality.\footnote{For example, if mispricing is either +25 or –25 percent, a stock with observed price 100 could be either an overpriced stock really worth 80 or an underpriced stock really worth 125. So the expected price correction is $(–0.20+0.25)/2 = 2.5\%$.}

Adopting a quadratic approximation, $1/(1 + \epsilon) \approx 1 - \epsilon + \epsilon^2$, and ignoring third moments like $E(\epsilon_{j,t}\epsilon_{j,t-1}^2)$, we can assess the likely order of magnitude:

$$1 + R_{j,t} \approx (1 + r_{j,t})(1 + \epsilon_{j,t} - \epsilon_{j,t-1} + \epsilon_{j,t-1}^2 - \epsilon_{j,t} \epsilon_{j,t-1} + \epsilon_{j,t} \epsilon_{j,t-1}^2),$$

$$\Rightarrow E(1 + R_{j,t}) \approx [1 + E(r_{j,t})][1 + \var(\epsilon)(1 - \rho_j)].$$

$$E(R_{j,t}) \approx E(r_{j,t}) + \var(\epsilon)(1 - \rho_j).$$ \hspace{1cm} (15)

FI adherents point out that the initial mispricing also shows up in the value weight: the observed weight $W_{j,t-1}$ differs from the true (noise-free) weight $w_{j,t-1}$ by the same error term,
scaled by the market’s value-weighted average error, $\epsilon_{m,t-1} := \sum_j w_{j,t-1}\epsilon_{j,t-1}$:

$$W_{j,t-1} := \frac{v_{j,t-1}(1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1})}{\sum_k v_{k,t-1}(1 + \epsilon_{k,t-1})},$$

$$= \frac{v_{j,t-1}(1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1})}{\left(\sum_k v_{k,t-1}\right)\left(\sum_k w_{k,t-1}(1 + \epsilon_{k,t-1})\right)},$$

$$= w_{j,t-1}\frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}}{1 + \epsilon_{m,t-1}}. \quad (16)$$

In qualitative discussions of FI (as opposed to the formal treatment in e.g. Hsu, 2009), the market-wide average error gets little attention. The correctness of such a view depends on the underlying view on the individual noise terms. If the latter would be small and independent across stocks and over time, like bid-ask bounce, the market average would have a minuscule variance and no autocorrelation. At the other extreme one could think of market-wide bubbles and busts, where mispricing tends to be persistent, large, and quite similar across stocks, implying a large and slow-to-disappear market-wide error. In-between, one could envisage a scenario where spurious price changes have both market-wide and idiosyncratic components.

Returning to FI, the core argument is that by value weighting a portfolio one creates a systematic interaction between the two effects of initial mispricing. This follows from the expressions for returns and weights, (13) and (16):

$$(1 + R_{j,t})W_{j,t-1} = \left[1 + r_{j,t}\frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}}{1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}}\right] w_{j,t-1}\frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}}{1 + \epsilon_{m,t-1}},$$

$$= (1 + r_{j,t}) w_{j,t-1}\frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t}}{1 + \epsilon_{m,t-1}}. \quad (17)$$

In the first line we see that $\epsilon_{j,t-1}$’s effects on return and on weight offset each other: underpriced stocks (with $\epsilon_{j,t-1} < 0$), for instance, have higher expected returns but this mispricing is offset in the weight, and similarly for overpriced stocks. If the market-wide error has trivial variance, the result is that the positive Jensen’s Inequality effect of noise on average returns is wiped out entirely. This is the ‘drag’ that the FI literature refers to. But that is not the end of the story: as the second line shows, the general result is that the individual initial pricing error is being replaced by the market’s average error, which brings its own Jensen’s-Inequality benefit. In a scenario of strong and pervasive bubbles and busts, for instance, individual and market-wide errors could be so similar that value-weighting hardly lowers returns.\(^{17}\)

Only if the market noise is trivial, is the errors-induced Jensen’s Inequality effect totally wiped out.

In general, then, the expected cost of weighting by value is proportional to the expected

\(^{17}\)If $\epsilon_j \approx \epsilon_m$, Equation (17) is close to a noisy return (13) times a noise-free weight $w_{j,t-1}$. \hfill
cost of replacing the individual error by the market-wide error:

$$\begin{align*}
E[(1 + R_j)(w_{j,t-1} - W_{j,t-1})] &= E \left( (1 + r_{j,t})w_{j,t-1} (1 + \epsilon_{j,t}) \left[ \frac{1}{1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}} - \frac{1}{1 + \epsilon_{m,t-1}} \right] \right); \\
E[(1 + R_j)(w_{j,t-1} - W_{j,t-1})]/w_{j,t-1} &\approx \left[ E(1 + r_{j,t}) \right] \left[ \text{var}(\epsilon_j)(1 - \rho_j) - \text{var}(\epsilon_m)(1 - \gamma_j) \right], \quad (18)
\end{align*}$$

where $$\gamma_j := \text{cov}(\epsilon_{j,t}, \epsilon_{m,t-1})/\text{var}(\epsilon_m)$$, the regression coefficient of the stock’s error vis-à-vis the lagged market-wide pricing error. So the degree of drag reduction induced by noise at the market level depends on the variance of this initial market-wide noise and its correlation with the final stock-specific error, but it is safe to say that value weighting will usually induce at least some net drag (i.e. miss some potential extra return).

Read differently, Equation (18) shows that the drag would be avoided if we could use the true weights, but the latter are of course unobservable. Still, as FI ripostes, we can still reduce the drag (and ideally even avoid it), on average, if we replace the noisy market weights by other proxies for the true weight, here based on ‘fundamental’ (i.e. accounting-based) variables. There is no claim that the new weights are more precise; in fact, they may even noisier than the market weight. The only requirement is that the alternative weight have a lower covariance with the market’s pricing error $$\epsilon_{j,t}$$. Let’s denote the alternative weight by $$w_{j,t-1}^* = w_{j,t-1} (1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}^*)$$ where $$\epsilon^*$$ is the deviation between the FI weight and the true one. Then the extra contribution $$\Delta_t$$ to the portfolio return from using the alternative weights is

$$\begin{align*}
\Delta_t := (1 + r_{j,t}) \frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t}}{1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}} \left[ w_{j,t-1}(1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}^*) - w_{j,t-1} \frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}}{1 + \epsilon_{m,t-1}} \right], \\
&= (1 + r_{j,t}) w_{j,t-1} \left[ \frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t}}{1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}} (1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}^*) - \frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t}}{1 + \epsilon_{m,t-1}} \right]. \quad (19)
\end{align*}$$

In an ideal application of FI, the alternative weighting error $$\epsilon_{j,t-1}^*$$ has zero conditional expectation and is not correlated with either the market’s pricing error $$\epsilon_{j,t-1}$$, the expected true return, or the true weight. Then, on average, all of the net drag induced by value weighting could be avoided. To see this, compute the expected gain per unit of weight,

$$\begin{align*}
\frac{E(\Delta)}{w_{j,t-1}} &= E_{t-1} \left( (1 + r_{j,t}) \left[ \frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t}}{1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}} (1 + \epsilon_{j,t-1}^*) - \frac{1 + \epsilon_{j,t}}{1 + \epsilon_{m,t-1}} \right] \right) \\
&\approx E(1 + r_{j,t}) \left[ \text{var}(\epsilon_j)(1 - \rho_j) - \text{var}(\epsilon_m)(1 - \gamma_j) \right]. \quad (20)
\end{align*}$$

where, as before, $$\gamma_j := \text{cov}(\epsilon_{j,t}, \epsilon_{m,t-1})/\text{var}(\epsilon_m)$$. The expression exactly matches the expected drag, per unit of weight, from using value weight instead of the ideal true weights (see Equation (18)).

---

18 All expectations are conditional on time $$t-1$$ information on $$j$$’s relevant characteristics, including its true value.
Figure 9: **Average extra monthly returns from using lagged weights instead of value weights for three past-performance classes of stocks**

![Graph showing average extra monthly returns for different lagged weights](image)

**Key** At the start of each month $t$ stocks are allocated to 3 momentum buckets. Bucket 1, 2 and 3 contain respectively the 25% worst, 50% middle and 25% best past performing stocks. The past performance is measured as the average return for the months $t-7$ until $t-2$. For each performance bucket, monthly index returns are calculated based on first-of-the-month value weights lagged 1, 3 or 6-months. Average monthly returns are in excess of the first-of-the-month value-weighted index within each performance category. The top schedule shows mean extra returns for the losers, using either one-, two- or three-month lagged weights; the middle-of-the-road performers’s extra returns are below, while the lowest schedule refers to winners.

**Appendix B: Reversal in small stocks**

In order to determine whether reversal might be at work in the lagged-weight strategy, we allocate stocks at the beginning of each month $t$ to either of three performance categories. The three categories contain respectively the 25% worst, 50% middle and 25% best performing stocks as measured via the average return for the months $t-7$ until $t-2$. For each performance category, we calculate returns for portfolios à la Basset et al., weighted by market caps lagged over 1 month, 3 months and 6 months, and we compare them to a standard VW portfolio containing the same stocks (i.e. either all losers, or all winners, or the mid-performers).

Figure 9 displays, for each of these performance classes, the extra average monthly returns obtained by using lagged weights rather than contemporaneous ones. That is, we calculate, for every observation $j,t$, the portfolio excess return $(w_{j,t-L} - w_{j,t-1})/(\sum_j w_{j,t-1} r_{j,t})$ for all $j$s that belong to the performance class and provide averages per performance class. Unsurprisingly,

---

19 Time $t-1$ is the time the portfolio is formed. It is standard to limit the evaluation period to $t-2$. If not, a possible pricing error in $V_{t-1}$ would affect both the sorting procedure and the subsequent portfolio return.
there appears to be no extra return when investing in middle-of-the-road performers. For winners, investing on the basis of 3- or 6-month lagged weights yields lower returns than investing on the basis of contemporaneous weights. This is consistent with momentum: winners go on winning, but by using lagged weights we assign too little capital to those stocks, so we underperform. The eye-opener, however, is the substantial extra return from using lagged weights in the case of losers. This suggests strong reversal rather than momentum: when using lagged weights for losers, we overinvest in them, by current-cap standards, which turns out to pay off handsomely when these stocks recover.

Appendix C: Bayesian updating of market values

In the Roll (1984) model, mispricing is to some extent identifiable, on average: if $E(\epsilon_{j,t}|v_{j,t}) = 0$, in general we no longer have a zero expectation for $\epsilon$ conditional on $V$: $E(\epsilon_{j,t}|V_{j,t}) = E(\epsilon_{j,t}|v_{j,t} + \epsilon_{j,t}) \neq 0$, so that $E(v_{j,t}|V_{j,t}) \neq V_{j,t}$. In a group of large stocks, for instance, there should typically be some bunching of overvaluations (positive errors) and vice versa.

For a more formal discussion we adopt the workhorse model for multiplicatives, the joint lognormal for $V$ and $v$. In one view, these values refer to one particular company $j$ about which the analyst has a prior with mean $\mu_{vj} := E(\ln v_j)$ and variance $\sigma^2_{vj} := \text{var}(\ln v)$; by experience, she knows there is an independent lognormal noise term, resulting in a lognormal $V$ with ex ante mean $\mu_{Vj} := E(\ln V_j)$ and variance $\sigma^2_{Vj} := \text{var}(\ln V)$. Equally, the math below may reflect the econometrician’s view who has no data on particular companies, but observes market values and infers a distribution of true values using exogenous distributional properties for the noise. To accommodate both views, we drop $j$ subscripts to the moments. The link between the true and market values is

$$\ln V = \ln v + \epsilon', \quad (21)$$

where $\epsilon' := \ln(1 + \epsilon) \sim N(-(1/2)\sigma^2_{\epsilon'}, \sigma^2_{\epsilon'})$, \( (22) \)

so that we still have $E(V|v) = v$. The mean of the conditional distribution of $v$ given $V$ is identified via the regression of $\ln v$ on $\ln V$. Equation (21) immediately implies three properties that are used in the math below: $\text{cov}(\ln V, \ln v) = \sigma^2_v$, $\sigma^2_V = \sigma^2_v + \sigma^2_\epsilon$, and $\mu_V = \mu_v - (1/2)\sigma^2_{\epsilon'}$. Below, we adopt the familiar equation linking the expectation of a lognormal variate to the mean and variance of the variate’s log. Given joint lognormality, the conditional mean of $\ln v$ given $\ln V$ is described by the regression of $\ln v$ on $\ln V$, and the conditional variance is
the error variance:

\[
E(v|V) = e^{E(\ln v|V) + 1/2\text{var}(v|V)} = e^{\mu_v + \beta (\ln V - \mu_V) + 1/2\sigma_{\epsilon'}^2},
\]

where \( \beta = \frac{\text{cov}(\ln V, \ln v)}{\text{var}(\ln V)} = \frac{\sigma_v^2}{\sigma_V^2 + \sigma_{\epsilon'}^2} < 1; \quad (23) \)

\[
= e^{\mu_V + \beta (\ln V - \mu_V)}, \quad V = e^{(\beta-1) (\ln V - \mu_V)}; \quad (24)
\]

\[
= Ve^{-\frac{\sigma_v^2}{\sigma_V^2} (\ln V - \mu_V)}. \quad (24)
\]

We conclude that, like in the examples, the correction relative to \( V \) is upward for below-average market caps and vice versa, and that the percentage bias is approximately proportional to the deviation of \( \ln V \) from its mean. We also note that the adjustment coefficient, \(-\frac{\sigma_v^2}{\sigma_V^2}\) is the same as the scaled covariance used in the Section 2, at least in the econometrician’s view alluded to above.

References


Hsu, J.C. (2006), Cap-weighted portfolios are sub-optimal portfolios, *Journal of investment*, 4(3); 1-10.


